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This article analyses the standard of good governance in tax matters introduced by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) in
2008, with a view to tackle tax fraud and tax evasion. At that time, the standard included transparency, exchange of information and fair tax
competition. Later on, several OECD and EU developments have changed the content of this standard. As of April 2018, the standard of good
governance includes also the four Minimum Standards of the Project to tackle base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) practices by multinationals.
This standard has been introduced by the EU as a precondition for third (non-EU) countries that receive EU development aid, conclude strategic
partnership agreements, free trade and economic partnership agreements and more recently as a standard that determines whether the third (non-
EU) country should be included in a single EU common list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. This article aims answers two questions (1) whether
the standard of good governance in tax matters is an import and/or export of EU norms? and (2) what is the legal status of this standard vis-á-vis
third (non-EU) countries? Finally, this article provides conclusions and recommendations for further research.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the EU ECOFIN introduced the standard of
good governance in tax matters for third (non-EU) coun-
tries with a view to tackle tax fraud and evasion. At that
time good governance was understood as transparency,
exchange of information, and fair tax competition.
However, this standard has changed over the years. The
most recent development took place in April 2018, when
ECOFIN introduced a new standard provision of good
governance in tax matters that included transparency,
exchange of information, fair taxation, and the four
Minimum Standards of the Project to tackle BEPS prac-
tices by multinationals.
One of the reasons for the introduction of this stan-
dard is the will of the EU to have a more important
role regarding international tax developments.1 In the
2016 EU Communication on an External Strategy for
Effective Taxation, the EU Commission stated that ‘as a
major political and economic player internationally, the
EU now also has an important role to play in continu-
ing to support BEPS, by pushing for its smooth and
timely implementation in the Single Market and
internationally’.2
This new role of the EU generates tensions between
EU and non-EU countries and it also raises questions
regarding the legal status of this standard, as the EU
is implementing the standard of good governance in
tax matters in international agreements concluded
with third (non-EU) countries. The standard of good
governance in tax matters has been introduced as a
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precondition for third (non-EU) countries that receive
EU development aid, conclude strategic and economic
partnership and free trade agreements, and, more
recently, as a standard to determine whether third
(non-EU) countries should be included in a
single EU common (black) list of non-cooperative
jurisdictions.
This article aims to answer two questions: Are the
elements of the standard of good governance in tax mat-
ters regarded as an import or an export of EU norms?
How can the legal status of the standard of good govern-
ance vis-à-vis third (non-EU) countries be assessed? sec-
tion 2 describes the EU standard of good governance in
tax matters. The first and second questions are answered
in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, section 5 pro-
vides conclusions and recommendations for further
research.
2 THE STANDARD OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
IN TAX MATTERS
2.1 The Principles of the Standard of Good
Governance in Tax Matters:
Transparency, Exchange of Information,
and Fair Tax Competition
In 2008, ECOFIN recommended the introduction of
the standard of good governance in tax matters, com-
prising the principles of transparency, exchange of
information and fair tax competition. At that time,
the 2008 financial crisis resulted in the need for coun-
tries to tackle tax fraud, tax avoidance, and the use of
tax havens by ensuring their commitment to transpar-
ency and exchange of information. ECOFIN also recog-
nized the need to promote, with the broadest possible
geographical scope, the standard of good governance.
The objective was to get as many third (non-EU) coun-
tries as possible to adhere to common principles of
cooperation and transparency.
In order to achieve this, the Council recommended to
insert the following text in relevant agreements concluded
between third countries and the Community or its
Member States:
‘With a view to strengthening and developing economic
activities while taking into account the need to develop an
appropriate regulatory framework, the Parties recognise
and commit themselves to implement the principles of
good governance in the tax area as subscribed to by
Member States at Community level. To that effect, with-
out prejudice to Community and Member States’ compe-
tences, the Parties will improve international cooperation
in the tax area, facilitate the collection of legitimate tax
revenues, and develop measures for the effective imple-
mentation of the abovementioned principles’.3
In 2009, the EU Commission published a Communication –
‘Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’4 for EU
Member States, EU potential candidates, and third countries
(including those receiving EU development aid).5 The aim of
which was to address how good governance could be
improved within the EU and ‘the particular tools that the
European Community and EU Member States may have at
their disposal to promote good governance internationally’.6
In a 2010 Communication, the EU Commission stated that:
‘the EU is seeking from all countries, and in particular its
partner countries, agreement on the basic cooperation princi-
ples of good governance in the tax area (transparency of the tax
system, exchange of information and fair tax competition) that
its Member States have already achieved. This would enhance
the capacity of EU Member States and their partner countries
to address international tax evasion and avoidance, building
on complementary international initiatives’.7
In a 2010 Resolution, the EU Parliament stressed:
(i) the need for provisions on good governance to be
negotiated in the context of general or specific agree-
ments with third countries and the need to ensure an
effective process for monitoring their implementation
and proposed (ii) the implementation of the Code of
Conduct for Business Taxation in their relations with
third countries in a manner consistent with EU efforts
to promote good governance in tax matters.8
Finally, the European Parliament also stated the willingness
to strengthen good tax governance within the EU in order
for it to have ‘a political and moral basis from which to
demand good tax governance of third countries’.9
Notes
3 Council of the European Union, 2866th Council Meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, 8850/08 (Presse 113), 22–23 (Press Release 14 May 2008), https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/100339.pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good
Governance in Tax Matters, COM(2009) 201 final (28 Apr. 2009), at 13.
5 In the Communication, the EU stated that ‘third countries eligible for development aid should also enhance commitments on tax governance. Otherwise, aid funding may be
reallocated to other countries, or in some cases even canceled’. Communication from the Commission, supra n. 4, at 12.
6 Ibid., at 5.
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Tax and Development: Cooperating with
Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, COM (2010)163 final (21 Apr. 2010), at 6.
8 European Parliament resolution of 10 Feb. 2010 on promoting good governance in tax matters (2009/2174(INI)) (10 Feb. 2010), paras 12–13.
9 Ibid.
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2.2 Fair Tax Competition and the List of
Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions
On 6 December 2012, the Commission published an
Action Plan – plus two Recommendations10 – to
strengthening the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion.
The standard of good governance in tax matters, addressed
in the second of those Recommendations, defined the
conditions that should be met by third countries,
namely11:
– the adoption of legal, regulatory, and administrative
measures in order to comply with the standard of
transparency and exchange of information, mainly
regarding the OECD terms of reference (addressing
availability of information, access to information and
exchange of information)12; and
– the absence of harmful tax measures in the area of
business taxation.
In order to assess whether the tax measures of a country
are harmful, the Second Recommendation included sev-
eral criteria – such as the lack of real economic activity
and substantial economic presence, rules providing
advantage to non-residents or rules regarding the profit
determination that deviates from internationally
accepted principles such as the OECD, rules among
others.13
Finally, the EU Commission asked EU Member States
to publish a black list of third countries that do not
comply with these minimum standards; would there be
a double taxation convention with a country not
complying with them, then the EU country should ‘either
seek to renegotiate the convention, suspend or terminate
the convention’.14 Despite these efforts to set up a black
list, it was not published and no tax treaty changes took
place.15
2.3 Fair Tax Competition, BEPS, and Listing
of Countries
Following the introduction of the BEPS Project in
2013, on 26 January 2016 the EU Commission pre-
sented the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package,16 which has
three pillars: (1) ensuring effective taxation in the EU,
(2) increasing tax transparency and (3) securing a level
playing field. This package included a 2016
Communication on an External Strategy for Effective
Taxation (and an Annex).17 In this Communication,
the tax haven black list was referenced in order to
‘secure effective taxation in relation to third countries,
which is mainly tackled through national anti-avoid-
ance measures. It complements the anti-tax-avoidance
measures’.18
Furthermore, the Commission re-examined the criteria
for the EU good governance in tax matters and developed
a process for assessing and blacklisting third countries not
complying with the criteria of good governance.19
According to the EU Commission, the objectives of the
EU list is to ‘improve tax good governance globally, and
to ensure that the EU’s international partners respect the
same standards as EU Members States do’.20 The elements
Notes
10 One on aggressive tax planning (First Recommendation) and another on measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in
tax matters (Second Recommendation). Furthermore, in point 9 of the Action Plan, the Commission announces its intention to set up a platform for Tax Good Governance.
European Commission, from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, COM
(2012) 722 final (6 Dec. 2012). See also European Commission, Commission Decision of 23 Apr. 2013 on setting up a Commission Expert Group to be known as the Platform for Tax
Good Governance, Aggressive Tax Planning and Double Taxation, OJ C120/17 (26 Apr. 2013), at 3.
11 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax
matters, C(2012) 8805 final (6 Dec. 2012), at 4. [hereinafter Commission Recommendation].
12 Ibid., Annex. The EU uses (with some wording adjustments, e.g. third country instead of jurisdiction) criteria set by the OECD in 2010. OECD, Launch of a Peer Review
Process: Terms of Reference to Monitor and Review Progress Towards Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes, 4–9 (OECD Publishing 2010), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824681.pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
13 The criteria are as follows: (1) whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of transactions carried out with non-residents, (2) whether advantages are
ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they do not affect the national tax base, (3) whether advantages are granted even without any real economic activity and substantial
economic presence within the third country offering such tax advantages, (4) whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within a multinational group
of companies departs from internationally accepted principles, notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD or (5) whether the tax measures lack transparency, including
where legal provisions are relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way. Commission Recommendation, supra n. 11, at 5.
14 Commission Recommendation, supra n. 11.
15 Even though no list was made available during this time, the Platform of Good Governance was discussing the criteria applied by EU Member States to establish lists of non-
cooperative jurisdictions. European Commission, Platform for Tax Good Governance, Discussion Paper on Criteria Applied by EU Member States to Establish Lists of Non-
Cooperative Jurisdictions, Platform/11/2014/EN (Oct. 2014).
16 The Anti-Tax Avoidance Package was presented by the EU Commission on 26 Jan. 2016. European Parliament, Legislative Train Schedule, External Strategy For Effective
Taxation, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-industrial-base-taxation/file-external-strategy-for-
effective-taxation (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
17 Communication from the Commission on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, supra n. 2, Annex I and II.
18 European Parliament, supra n. 16.
19 Following the black listing, ‘the Council adopted defensive measures against the blacklisted jurisdictions, both non-tax countermeasures (related to the European Fund for
Sustainable Development) and tax countermeasures (reinforced monitoring of certain transactions, increased audit risks for taxpayers investing or using structures or
arrangements involving the black-listed jurisdictions, and several anti-BEPS measures)’. P. J. Wattel & A. P. Dourado, Third States and External Relations, in European Tax
Law: General Topics and Direct Taxation, Fed Fiscale Studieserie vol. 1, 214 (P. J. Wattel, O. Marres & H. Vermeulen eds, Kluwer 2018).
20 European Commission, Common EU List of Third Country Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
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taken into account for blacklisting a jurisdiction are the
following:
- transparency: Does the jurisdiction comply with the
international standards on information exchange?;
- fair tax competition: Does the country have harmful tax
practices or regimes? Does it apply anti-BEPS mea-
sures?; and
- real economic activity: Does the country’s tax rate encou-
rage artificial tax structures?
The work of the Commission also takes into account some
EU Parliament Resolutions, namely: (1) the Resolution
prepared by the Special Committee on Tax Rulings
(TAXE 1), adopted in plenary on 25 November 2015
and (2) the resolution on ‘bringing transparency, coordi-
nation and convergence to corporate tax policies in the
Union’, adopted in plenary on 16 December 2015.
Accordingly, in:
‘these resolutions, Parliament stressed in particular the
negative spill-over effect of tax avoidance and tax eva-
sion and that ensuring fair competition in the internal
market and protecting Member States’ tax bases
depends very much on addressing the weakest link
regarding interactions with low or no-tax and secrecy
jurisdictions’.21
Following this Communication, on 5 December 2017 the
EU Council adopted the EU blacklist of non-cooperative
jurisdictions for tax purposes.22 This list builds on the
countries provided by EU Member States, and includes
seventeen non-EU countries or territories that failed to
make sufficient commitments in response to EU concerns.
Since its adoption, the number of jurisdictions in this list
has been reduced: there are only five countries left in it as
at 14 December 2018.23
2.4 Standard of Good Governance in Tax
Matters for Third Countries Including
BEPS Minimum Standards
On 26 April 2018, ECOFIN introduced a new standard of
good governance in tax matters that also includes the
implementation of the BEPS Minimum Standards. For
this purpose, ECOFIN recalled the Council Conclusions
of 14 May 2008 and 25 May 2016, recommending the
introduction of the following text in all relevant agree-
ments concluded with third countries by the EU and EU
Member States:
‘The Parties recognise and commit themselves to imple-
ment the principles of good governance in the tax area,
including the global standards on transparency and
exchange of information, fair taxation, and the minimum
standards against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
The Parties will promote good governance in tax mat-
ters, improve international cooperation in the tax area
and facilitate the collection of legitimate tax revenues’.24
2.5 Intermediate Conclusion
The standard of good governance in tax matters has been
developed by EU institutions, mainly ECOFIN, the
Commission and the Parliament. The text of the standard,
as introduced in 2008, has changed throughout the years
along with international tax developments.
When the standard of good governance in tax matters
was introduced, the priority of the EU, the G20, and the
OECD was to strengthen international tax cooperation in
order to tackle tax fraud and tax evasion. Therefore, in the
2008 ECOFIN, the 2009 and 2010 Commission
Communications, and the 2010 Parliament resolution,
transparency and exchange of information were encouraged.
Furthermore, the standard of fair tax competition was
regarded in light of the EU (soft) law Code of Conduct
for Business Taxation. The 2009 Communication also sta-
ted that this standard should be implement not only for EU
countries and potential candidates, but also for third coun-
tries requiring EU development aid, or countries conclud-
ing agreements with the EU or with EU Member States.
The introduction of the BEPS Project has changed this
standard not only within the EU but also in respect of
third (non-EU) countries. These changes have taken place
by means of the introduction of (1) the 2016 Anti-Tax
Avoidance Package, (2) the publication of the 2016
Notes
21 European Parliament, supra n. 16.
22 In addition to the blacklist, there is also a grey list, and a list with a category of countries removed from the blacklist but subject to close monitoring. As explained by
Wattel and Dourado, in the ‘grey list’ (at that time 2017) forty-seven jurisdictions ‘are expected to upgrade their “tax good governance principles” sufficiently so as not to be
blacklisted. These 47 have publicly committed to implement automatic exchange of information, to conclude a relevant network of agreements covering EU Member States,
to implement minimum anti-BEPS standards, to abolish harmful tax regimes and tax regimes facilitating offshore structures that attract profits without real economic
activity and/or to become a member of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes’. Wattel & Dourado, supra n. 19, at 214. As
of 14 Dec. 2018, this ‘grey list’ has increased to sixty-three jurisdictions. For an overview of the EU list of tax havens in European Commission, see Evolution of the EU List of
Tax Havens, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/eu_list_update_04_12_2018_en.pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
23 The last country taken out of the black list is Namibia. As at 14 Dec. 2018, there are five countries on the black list: American Samoa, Guam, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago
and US Virgin Islands. Council of the European Union, Taxation: EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-
cooperative-jurisdictions/# (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
24 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the ‘EU Standard Provision on Good Governance in Tax Matters for Agreements with Third Countries, FISC 180, ECOFIN 364
(26 Apr. 2018), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8344-2018-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
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Communication on an External Strategy for Effective
Taxation and an Annex, (3) the publication of the EU
list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions to secure effective
taxation in relation to third countries – and the new text
(2018) of the EU standard of good governance in tax
matters (which includes, in addition to transparency,
exchange of information and fair tax competition) and
(4) the adoption of the BEPS Minimum Standards.
The analysis of the legal status of the standard in the
agreements will be addressed in section 4 below. The
following paragraph will address the standard of good
governance as export and/or import of norms.
3 THE STANDARD OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN
TAX MATTERS AS DEVELOPED BY THE EU:
EXPORT AND/OR IMPORT OF NORMS?
3.1 The Import and Export of Standards by
the EU
The introduction of standards by the EU in its agreements
is not a new development. In the past, scholars have
analysed the import and export of standards in other
areas,25 but not so much in the field of taxation.26
The import and export of standards can take place due
to different reasons.27 One of them could be authority,28
when the EU is exporting standards to third (non-EU)
countries as a condition to conclude trade agreements e.g.
EU environmental or labour standards introduced in trade
agreements with third (non-EU) countries.29 Countries
can also voluntarily adopt the EU legal framework due
to necessity. This is true for the legal framework provided
in the EU 1995 Data Protection Directive, which has
been voluntarily adopted (imported) by non-EU countries
in order to regulate data protection and privacy.30
However, in some cases, the standards are not standards
developed by the EU, but international standards which are
thereafter used by the EU in agreements concluded with third
(non-EU) countries. For instance, in a comparison made by
Scott on climate change, environment, maritime transport, air
transport, and financial services, the author concluded that
some of the standards introduced by the EU were not norms
developed by the EU, but international standards.31
For Scott, in principle, the standards required by the
EU are regarded as:
international agreed standards, but occasionally, these
standards are required by the EU before the relevant
international standards have entered into force, or
before the standards are in a binding form, or even in
cases where these standards have been ratified by only a
small number of states.
For Scott, by requiring countries to adopt international stan-
dards, the EU is influencing the evolution of international
law.32
Another way for the EU to influence international law
in the rest of the world is by means of the so-called
‘Brussels effect’. For Bradford, the EU has a regulatory
power, as the EU sets the global rules across a range of
areas, such as food, chemicals, the environment, competi-
tion, and the protection of privacy. This author rightly
states that:
Notes
25 See e.g. a comparative analysis of the import and export of EU norms by several EU countries and some non-EU countries (Australia, China, New Zealand and Russia, as well
as ASEAN countries) including how the norms are adopted, adapted, resisted or rejected in those countries. A. Björkdahl, N. Chaban, J. Leslie & A. Masselot, Importing EU
Norms: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Finding, United Nations University Series on Regionalism vol. 8 (Springer 2015). See also M. Cremona, The Single Market as a
Global Export Brand: Exporting the Single Market, 21(5) Eur. Bus. L. Rev. 663 (2010).
26 Two exceptions are a reference to EU’s good tax governance standards exporting in C. Panayi, Europeanization of Good Tax Governance, 36(1) Y.B. Eur. L. 442 (2017); Wattel
& Dourado, supra n. 19, at 179 (referring to the ‘exportation’ to third States of EU tax good governance rules).
27 The reasons for import and export in norms has been discussed in comparative legal scholarship when referring to legal transplants. In the past, I addressed the reasons
suggested by legal scholars as the predominant factor in determining which laws are transplanted. Accordingly, legal transplantation takes place due to (1) authority, (2)
prestige and imposition, (3) chance and necessity, (4) expected efficacy of the law and (5) political, economic and reputational incentives from the countries and third parties.
I. J. Mosquera Valderrama, Leasing and Legal Culture: Towards Consistent Behaviour in Tax Treatment in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions, dissertation (2007). See also I. J.
Mosquera Valderrama, Legal Transplants and Comparative Law, Int’l L.J. 261 (2004).
28 As argued by Meunier and Nicolaïdis, this development is the result of the EU becoming ‘a power through trade. Increasingly, it uses market access as a bargaining chip to
promote changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners, from labour standards to development policies. Indeed, the last decade its policy makers have sought to
“harness globalization” and spread, through the negotiation of trade agreements, the “European model” to the rest of the world’. S. Meunier & K. Nicolaïdis, The European
Union as a Trade Power, in International Relations and the European Union 294 (C. Hill & M. Smith eds, Oxford University Press 2011).
29 In trade, scholars have addressed the influence of EU including also the problems of legitimacy of international trade and investment agreements concluded by the EU with
third countries. Global Governance Through Trade: EU Policies and Approaches, Leuven Global Governance Series. (J. Wouters, A. Marx, D. Geraets & B. Natens eds, Edward
Elgar Publishing 2015). See also K. Yiannibas, Democratizing International Trade and Investment Agreements in the European Union, in Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union
and Global Governance 343 (B. Pérez de las Heras ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
30 In taxation, in a comparison of data protection rules in four non-EU countries, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and South Africa it was concluded that the domestic data
protection rules have been based in the definitions and safeguards provided in the EU 1995 Data Protection Directive. This 1995 Directive has been repealed by the Apr.
2016 Regulation and the Directive adopted by the European Parliament. I. J. Mosquera Valderrama et al., The Rule of Law and the Effective Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights in
Developing Countries, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2017-10 (2017).
31 For the author, the EU measures are based on international standards, and when not, the standards tend to ‘characterized by a contingent quality that flows from the
provisionality and substantive openness of the measures concerned. This contingent quality injects a dynamic dimension into EU law, whereby the EU intervenes not with a
view to exporting its standards but with a view to launching interactive processes to identify and evaluate the different approaches that may adopted to ensure that shared
regulatory objectives can be met’. J. Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62(1) Amer. J. Comp. L. 125 (2014).
32 Scott, supra n. 31, at 112.
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‘without resorting to international institutions or seek-
ing other nations’ cooperation, the EU is able to pro-
mulgate regulations that become entrenched in the
legal frameworks of developed and developing markets
alike, leading to the “Europeanization” of important
aspects of global commerce’.33
The analysis of the EU’s active engagement with the
international legal order has been done in several areas
such as the promotion of the rule of law, WTO (trade)
law, climate change policy, and environmental and finan-
cial regulations.34 As rightly stated by Kochenov and
Amtenbrink, the EU plays an important role in the for-
mation of international law. This new role of the EU:
takes place through a number of avenues ranging from the
consequences of the mere existence of this supranational
legal order within the sphere of international law – provid-
ing a model way of thinking about an alternative
approach to the prevalent practice of framing international
relations, thus inciting actions of others and providing a
point of inspiration to the attempts by the Union to
engage in a proactive co-shaping of the international
legal order alongside other actors.35
In light of the use of international standards by the EU and
its active engagement in the international legal order, this
article will analyse whether the use of the standard of good
governance by the EU in the field of taxation is an import
or export of norms, and to assess the legal status of the
standard of good governance vis-à-vis third (non-EU) coun-
tries. This analysis will be made in sections 3.2 and 4.
3.2 The Standard of Good Governance in Tax
Matters
3.2.1 Transparency, Exchange of Information and
the BEPS Four Minimum Standards: Import of
Norms
The introduction of transparency, exchange of information
and the BEPS four Minimum Standards by the EU – as
described in section 2 above – shows that the content of
the standard of good governance in tax matters is not a
new standard developed by the EU, because it comprises
several international standards drafted by the OECD with
the political support of the G20. These standards are
transparency, exchange of information (on request and
automatic), and the BEPS four Minimum Standards.
The development of these standards by the OECD took
place in 2000, 2009, 2013, 2015 and 2016. For instance,
in 2000, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for tax purposes was created with
the aim to promote the standard of transparency and
exchange of information on request. Later, in 2009, the
Forum was restructured ‘in response to the G20 call to
strengthen implementation of these standards’.36 In 2013,
the OECD introduced a global standard on automatic
exchange of financial account information. Thereafter in
2013, the OECD/G20 introduced the BEPS Project and,
in 2016, it introduced the BEPS Inclusive Framework
where countries commit to the implementation of the
BEPS four Minimum Standards.
Parallel to these developments, the EU has made use of
these standards for instance in the 2008 ECOFIN
Recommendation,37 the 2012 EU Action Plan,38 the
2016 Anti-Tax Avoidance Package including the
External Strategy for Effective Taxation,39 and the 2018
ECOFIN Recommendation.40
Therefore, the standard of transparency, exchange of
information and the BEPS four Minimum Standards are
international standards developed by the OECD and the
G20 that have been (or will be) imported by the EU in
the agreements concluded (or under negotiation) between
the EU or its Members and third (non-EU) countries. The
legal status of these standards will be addressed in section
4 below.
3.2.2 Fair Tax Competition: Export of Norms
Unlike the standards mentioned in section 3.2.1, the EU
standard of fair tax competition is not based on an inter-
national OECD/G20 standard, but on a standard devel-
oped by the EU.
In 1996, at an informal ECOFIN meeting in Verona,
Finance Ministers agreed to establish a High-Level Group
Notes
33 A. Bradford, Exporting Standards: The Externalization of the EU’s Regulatory Power via Markets, 42 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 158 (2015).
34 The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (D. Kochenov & F. Amtenbrink eds, Cambridge University Press 2013). See also M. Telò, The European Union and
Global Governance, Routledge/GARNET series, Book 6 (Routledge 2009).
35 D. Kochenov & F. Amtenbrink, Introduction: The Active Paradigm of the Study of the EU’s Place in the World, in Kochenov & Amtenbrink eds, supra n. 35, at 2.
36 In the Sept. 2009 meeting of the Global Forum, the members decided to create a self-standing secretariat based in the OECD and agreed on reviewing the effective
implementation of the OECD standards by means of carrying out a monitoring and peer review of the jurisdictions that have implemented these standards. As of Aug. 2018,
this Global Forum has 153 members. OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, http://www.oecd.org/TAX/TRANSPARENCY/
(accessed 14 Dec. 2018). See also I. J. Mosquera Valderrama, EU and OECD Proposals for International Tax Cooperation: A New Road?, 59(8) Tax Notes Int’l 611 (2010).
37 See s. 2.1 above.
38 See s. 2.3 above.
39 Ibid.
40 See s. 2.4 above.
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to discuss the issues addressed by the Commission in its
1996 Discussion Paper, ‘Taxation in the European Union’.41
Among other tax issues, the High-Level Group addressed
the lack of a common standard and objective understanding
of what constitutes an unfair measure. Therefore, the mem-
bers of the High-level Group ‘stressed their concerns that the
effects of fiscal erosion could ultimately endanger the
achievement of vital Community objectives, and, as a result,
called for a common approach within the Union’.
Later, in 1997, the EU referred to the positive effects of
fair competition in its ‘EU Package to Tackle Harmful Tax
Competition’, but it also stated that ‘unrestrained tax com-
petition for mobile forms of business increasingly threatens
to cause economic distortions and to erode tax bases within
the Community’. Therefore, one of the measures introduced
by the EU to achieve fair competition was the Code of
Conduct of Business Taxation. In this Code, the EU identi-
fies ‘tax measures that are potentially harmful and provides a
framework within which Member States can commit them-
selves to follow the principles of fair competition’.42
This approach towards harmful taxation was followed
by the OECD 1998 report on Harmful Tax Competition,
in which the OECD stated that the location decisions by
investors should be driven by economic considerations
rather than by tax factors. Therefore, in an attempt to
make a distinction between the effects of tax competition,
the OECD stated that particular tax practices can have a
harmful effect in other countries’ tax bases, and that these
practices should be labelled as harmful tax competition.43
In respect of the EU standard of good governance in tax
matters, fair tax competition has been addressed since 2008
as one of the elements of this standard. Later, in the 2012
Commission Recommendation,44 the EU stated that one of
the criteria for third non-EU countries to meet the standard
of good governance was to ‘not operate harmful tax mea-
sures in the area of business taxation’.45
More recently, fair tax competition has become a relevant
concept following international tax developments, mainly
through the introduction of the OECD BEPS Project. The
EU Commission, in its 2016 Communication on an
External Strategy for Effective Taxation, stated that:
‘when the Commission’s 2012 Recommendation was
presented, the issue of fair tax competition was not central
to the international agenda. The Commission recom-
mended that Member States assess third countries’ tax
systems on the basis of the Code of Conduct on Business
Taxation, which is the EU’s own tool for countering
harmful tax regimes. In the meantime, after two years of
negotiation, the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project has been finalized and endorsed by the
G20. This has created new international standards for
fair corporate taxation, which all G20/OECD members
and associated countries have committed to implement’.46
As a result of the application of the standard of good
governance in tax matters – and, more specifically, in respect
of fair tax competition – countries have been assessed to find
out whether they have harmful tax practices or regimes.47 In
addition, the EU has decided to go further in the evaluation
of the fair tax competition by: (1) re-examining the EU good
governance criteria to include state aid rulings48; (2) by
developing a process for assessing and listing third countries
that do not comply with the criteria of good governance; and
(3) by introducing the BEPS four Minimum Standards in the
standard of fair tax competition.49 This new approach gen-
erates tensions between EU and non-EU countries, and it
also raises questions regarding the link between fair tax
competition, BEPS, and the legal status of the standard of
good governance in tax matters.
4 THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STANDARD
OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TAX MATTERS
4.1 The Different Approaches to the
Standard in Agreements with Third
Countries
ECOFIN stated in 2008 (and again in 2018) that the
standard of good governance in tax matters shall be
adopted in all agreements concluded by EU and EU
Member States with third countries without prejudice of
the respective competences.50 This means that this text
Notes
41 Commission of the European Communities, Taxation in the European Union – Discussion paper for the Informal Meeting of ECOFIN Ministers, SEC(96) 487 final (20 Mar. 1996).
42 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union, COM(97) 564 final (5
Nov. 2997), at 7.
43 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD Publishing 1998), para. 9.
44 Commission Recommendation, supra n. 11, at 4.
45 See s. 2.2 above.
46 Communication from the Commission on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, supra n. 2, at 5.
47 European Commission, supra n. 20.
48 State aid rulings and the effect in the EU, in third (non-EU countries) and companies will be addressed in another forthcoming article by this author. For the purposes of this
article, some reference to the problems in the 2016 definition of fair tax competition that includes state aid rulings will be addressed in s. 4.3.1 below.
49 For an analysis of BEPS in the standard of fair tax competition, see s. 4.3 below.
50 This clause included in addition to transparency, exchange of information, and fair taxation, also the adoption by third (non-EU) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
international standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. Communication from the Commission on an External Strategy
for Effective Taxation, supra n. 2, Annex 2.
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can also be included, for instance, in trade, strategic, and
economic partnership agreements – including the agree-
ments currently under negotiation by the EU and its
Member States.51
The Commission asked ECOFIN for flexibility for the
negotiation of this clause. For instance in the 2009
Communication, the Commission asked for ‘sufficient
flexibility in its negotiations on wording, while preser-
ving the substantial elements and objectives of good
governance, so as to be able to negotiate solutions that
best fit the specific case of each country’.52 The 2009 EU
Communication also stated that the provision to be
introduced in the agreements should be mentioned as
early as possible in the negotiation of the agreement, and
‘in cases where it is known in advance that the discussion
of the principles of good governance in the tax area will
be contentious, or where such principles are not under-
stood the introduction of this provision should be
addressed in advance (for instance, in trade-related
negotiations)’.53
This requirement for flexibility was also addressed by
the EU Commission in Annex 2 of the 2016 EU
Recommendation, stating that ‘considering the diversity
of the EU’s international partners the Council should give
the Commission sufficient flexibility in its ongoing and
future negotiations with third countries on the basis of the
agreed clause’.54
Consider the following texts of the standard of good
governance in tax matters in various agreements:
– EU–Canada 2016 Strategic Partnership Agreement:
Article 11: Cooperation on taxation: ‘to apply the
principles of good governance in the tax area i.e.
transparency, exchange of information and avoidance
of harmful tax practices in the framework of the
OECD Forum on harmful tax practice and the
Union Code of Conduct on business taxation, as
applicable’;
– EU–Japan 2018 Strategic Partnership Agreement:
Article 19: Taxation:
– ‘to enhance transparency, ensure exchange of
information and eliminate harmful tax practices’;
– EU–South Korea 2010 Framework Agreement:
Article 12: Taxation:
– ‘commit to implement in the tax area the princi-
ples of transparency, exchange of information and
fair tax competition’;
– EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation:
– ‘Commit to reach an agreement on the adoption
of the Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of
Information’; and
– EU–Colombia-Peru 2010 Free Trade Agreement
Article 155(5) Effective and Transparent regulation:
– ‘The parties also take note of the ‘Ten Key
Principles for Information Sharing’ promulgated
by the Finance Ministers of the G7 Nations and
the Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax
Matters of the OECD and the statement on trans-
parency and exchange of information for tax pur-
poses of the G20’.
As seen in the above list, the EU Commission has made use of
wording flexibility of the in the negotiation of the agreements,
as the text of the standard in the agreements concluded up
until now varies between ‘exchange of information’, ‘harmful
tax practices’, and/or ‘fair tax competition’. The type of agree-
ment also varies between ‘strategic partnership agreements’
(Canada and Japan), ‘framework agreement’ (South Korea),
‘strategic agenda for cooperation’ (China), and ‘Free Trade
Agreement’ (Colombia and Peru).
Furthermore, the use of the standard of good governance
has resulted in different approaches for each agreement. For
instance, in the Strategic Partnership between the EU and
Canada, Article 11 has a complete provision of good tax
governance based in the 2008 wording, whereas the strate-
gic agenda for cooperation between EU and China includes
only the requirement for China to adopt the Global
Standard on automatic exchange of information.
However, it is not clear how this flexibility will be
assessed: if the result is that some countries will only be
required to implement exchange of information, whereas
others will also have to comply with the fair tax competition
requirement. In addition, the 2018 wording of the standard
that includes BEPS four Minimum Standards may also raise
tensions, as not all third countries have committed to the
implementation of these BEPS four Minimum Standards.
In some cases, a country can be compelled to adopt the
BEPS four Minimum Standards, even when it has decided not
to do so. For instance, in the ASEAN region, there is an
ongoing trade negotiation55 between the EU and ASEAN
countries – Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand,
Indonesia and Philippines – of which Philippines has not
committed to the implementation of the BEPS four
Minimum Standards.56 However, if the standard of good
Notes
51 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations (Dec. 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (accessed 19 Dec. 2018).
52 Communication from the Commission, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, supra n. 4, at 11.
53 Ibid.
54 Communication from the Commission on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, supra n. 2, Annex 2.
55 European Commission, supra n. 51.
56 The Philippines was invited by the OECD to participate in the meetings on the BEPS Project. As explained by Jacinto-Henares, the Internal Revenue Commissioner of
Philippines (until 30 June 2016), at the time of the discussion of the BEPS Project, ‘as a participant, the Philippines did not have any right to vote, and was merely asked to
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governance in tax matters (which also includes the BEPS four
Minimum Standards) is introduced as a condition, Philippines
may be compelled to introduce these standards even though it
has no political will to do so at this time. Therefore, the
successful conclusion of trade negotiations would become
more difficult.
Another example can be found in the different
approaches of the standard of fair tax competition in trade
or economic partnership negotiations, such as the recent
Directives57 on the negotiation of a new Partnership
Agreement between the EU and its Members with
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (the ACP Cotonu
Agreement).58 In the negotiation Directives, the EU
Council stated that the parties will commit to take concrete
measures to adopt the international standards, paying par-
ticular attention to increasing tax transparency, exchange of
information, and fair tax competition. Notwithstanding the
introduction of the BEPS Minimum Standards by ECOFIN
on 26 April 2018 to the BEPS Minimum Standards, no
reference was made to them in these negotiation Directives;
instead, there was a reference to ‘measures to tackle aggres-
sive tax planning’. Therefore, the EU and ACP countries
will need to agree on what type of measures refer to
aggressive tax planning, and if so, how do these measures
relate to the BEPS four Minimum Standards.
The differences in the application of the standard of good
governance in tax matters in trade and strategic partnership
agreements should be object of attention by the EU
Institutions, as the inconsistent use of the standard of
good governance in their agreements may also impact in
the understanding of this standard, and may create tensions
among parties during the negotiation process of trade or
economic partnership negotiations. The following para-
graphs will assess the legal status of the standard of good
governance vis-à-vis third (non-EU) countries.
4.2 Transparency, Exchange of Information
and BEPS Four Minimum Standards
The standards of transparency and exchange of information
have been adopted by developed and developing countries
via several binding instruments.59 The first instrument is
the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters, which enhances all forms of
tax cooperation, including exchange of information as
signed by 126 countries (as of 14 December 2018).60 The
second instrument is the Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement, which provides an international framework for
automatic exchange of financial account information,
signed by 104 countries (as of 14 December 2018).61
Unlike the standard of exchange of information agreed
in Multilateral Conventions, the BEPS four Minimum
Standards (at least BEPS Action 5 and 13)62 are soft
law,63 and thus not legally binding; however, there is an
expectation that they will be implemented by the 124
countries/jurisdictions (December 2018)64 that are parti-
cipating in the BEPS Inclusive Framework.65 These
Notes
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of the 2015 BEPS package in Oct. 2015, the OECD invited the Philippines to join the Inclusive Framework in Kyoto, Japan in July 2016, but the Philippines did not join.
K. Jacinto-Henares, A Commentary on the BEPS Project and Its Influence on Developing Countries, in Asian Voices: BEPS and Beyond (S. Sim & M.-J. Soo eds, IBFD 2017).
57 These Directives were approved by the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper). ‘Coreper is
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integration, State fragility and aid effectiveness’. European Commission, ACP – The Cotonou Agreement, https:availableat//ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-
and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en (accessed 14 Dec. 2018). This agreement will come to an end by 2020. Therefore, on 22 June 2018, the EU Council gave
authorization to the EU Commission to open negotiations for a new partnership agreement with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). European
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59 On the content of these initiatives, see F. Debelva & I. J. Mosquera Valderrama, Privacy and Confidentiality in Exchange of Information Procedures: Some Uncertainties, Many Issues,
but Few Solutions, 45(5) Intertax 362 (2017).
60 OECD, Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters: Status 29 November 2018, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
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29 October 2018, http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
62 The introduction of two of the four BEPS Minimum Standards Action 6 and 14 in the Multilateral Instrument could be regarded as binding for the countries who have
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Mosquera Valderrama, Output Legitimacy Deficits and the Inclusive Framework of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative, 72(3) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2018).
64 OECD, Members of the Inclusive Framework (Nov. 2018), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf (accessed 14 Dec. 2018).
65 A. Christians, Hard Law and Soft Law in International Taxation, 25(2) Wis. Int’l L.J. 325 (2007). One definition of soft law that can be also made applicable to the BEPS
Inclusive Framework is ‘rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have
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countries have a peer review schedule for the implementa-
tion of the BEPS four Minimum Standards, and if these
Minimum Standards have not been implemented, the
OECD will give a negative review that may also have
consequences for the reviewed country, mainly due to the
peer review pressure.66
In light of the above, it can be argued that the standard
of good governance in tax matters uses binding and non-
binding international standards. In respect of transparency
and exchange of information, the standards are binding
and have been ratified by more than half of the 193
countries around the world, i.e. 126 for the Multilateral
Convention, and 104 for the Multilateral Competent
Authority Agreement. In respect of the BEPS four
Minimum Standards, these are non-binding standards
that 124 countries/jurisdictions have committed to
implement.
4.3 Fair Tax Competition
4.3.1 Problems with the Definition of Fair Tax
Competition
In the standard of good governance, the EU has made
reference to fair competition, fair taxation, unfair and
harmful tax competition. In some cases, the EU refers to
fair competition vs. unfair competition, and in other cases,
it refers to fair competition vs. harmful tax competition.67
The EU has also addressed fair tax competition in respect
of state aid provisions.
In the EU Communication on an External Strategy for
Effective Taxation dated 28 January 2016,68 the
Commission stated that, ‘in view of these fundamental
changes in the global tax environment, and the need for
more coherence in Member States’ assessments of third
countries, the EU’s good governance criteria should be
updated’.
For this purpose, in Annex 1 to the Communication a
definition of fair tax competition is provided, stating that it:
‘means that a third country should not operate harmful
tax measures in the area of business taxation. Tax mea-
sures which provide for a significantly lower effective level
of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels
which generally apply in the third country in question
are to be regarded as potentially harmful. Such a signifi-
cantly lower level of taxation may operate by virtue of the
nominal tax rate, the tax base or any other relevant factor.
When assessing whether such measures are harmful,
account should be taken of the criteria as provided for in
the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation endorsed by
the Council, as well as practice and guidance agreed by
the Code of Council working group’.69
Despite this definition, as rightly argued by Panayi, the
application of this standard as developed by the EU
creates more vagueness and allows the EU to apply this
standard in a subjective way. Panayi states that:
‘by inserting the component of fair tax competition,
much unnecessary vagueness has been introduced in this
area. This is rather unfortunate and open to criticism, as
fair tax competition is likely to be linked with harmful
tax competition, itself a vague concept used in the past to
address similar concerns. Arguably, fair tax competition is
even harder to decipher as a concept. Although some
guidelines were developed in the past in an attempt to
describe what could be harmful tax practices and harmful
preferential tax regimes, obviously these do not necessarily
cover unfair tax competition. Arguably, something that is
not harmful (as per the existing much criticized OECD
guidelines) may not necessarily be fair. To an extent, there
is an additional layer of value judgement–and, as a cor-
ollary, subjectivity–inherent in any concept that incorpo-
rates the term “fair”’.70
Following the use of the standard of fair tax competi-
tion, in 2017 EU countries created a black list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions. The countries included in this
list are provided by EU Member States, and after a screen-
ing and dialogue process with non-EU countries, to assess
them against agreed criteria for good governance,71
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68 Communication from the Commission on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, supra n. 2.
69 Ibid., Annex 1 at 3.
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countries may be removed from this list by the Council of
the EU.72
However, one of the problems in the development of
the standard of fair tax competition is to establish the link
between (1) fair tax competition that requires an equal
level playing field, and (2) fair tax competition in the
standard of good governance which does not guarantee the
equal level playing field due to its sometimes political
(and discretionary) application. For instance, in some
cases, countries have carried out extensive (political)
lobby so that they can be excluded from this list73 and
in other cases countries have not been included in the list
even though these countries could meet the criteria to
enter it.74 As a result of this process, the blacklist of non-
cooperative jurisdictions has been reduced from seventeen-
75 to five76 countries in less than a year.77
The vagueness of the criterion of fair tax competition is
also shown in the elaboration of the criteria to assess non-
cooperative jurisdictions. Following the 2016 EU
Communication, in order to comply with fair taxation,
countries must not have harmful tax practices or regimes
and must apply anti-BEPS measures. Later, in November
2016,78 the criteria for screening jurisdictions was further
elaborated by ECOFIN. In respect of fair taxation, it
included the following:
(1) the jurisdiction should have no preferential tax mea-
sures that could be regarded as harmful according to
the criteria set out in 1997 Code of conduct for
business taxation; and
(2) the jurisdiction should not facilitate offshore struc-
tures or arrangements aimed at attracting profits
which do not reflect real economic activity in the
jurisdiction.79
As rightly argued by Dourado:
the vagueness of the later criterion is an interesting link
to the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, but
gives rise to a discretionary assessment by the
Member States and the Code of Conduct Group leading
the screening and follow up processes. The latter criter-
ion also introduces pressure on the EU Member States
as regards whether they themselves comply with the
fair taxation criteria.80
Dourado rightly concludes that the ‘worldwide credibility
of the EU black list will very much depend on the
implementation of the fair taxation criterion by the EU
Member States themselves’.81
If one example may illustrate this, is that the use of the
blacklist only for third (non-EU) countries has been criti-
cized by civil society. In their view, EU countries should
be also included in this list. For instance, George Turner,
in a Tax Justice Network blog, stated that:
‘one of the issues the EU faces is that a number of its
own members – the UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands – are all playing
the game themselves. Putting in place aggressive tax
policies designed to pinch profits made abroad. They
have little interest in the EU taking a strong stance
against tax havens, and some of these governments have
lobbied for years to water down the EU’s efforts’.82
Another important criterion in fair tax competition
included in the 2016 (January) EU Communication and
in the 2016 (November) ECOFIN Conclusions refers to
BEPS. In this regard, two criteria were introduced in the
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ECOFIN document for the jurisdiction to be considered
compliant with BEPS: one initial criterion and one future
criterion (to be applied once the reviews by the Inclusive
Framework of the agreed minimum standards are com-
pleted). The initial criterion is the commitment, by the
end of 2017, to the agreed OECD anti-BEPS Minimum
Standards and their consistent implementation. The
future criterion is for the jurisdiction to receive a positive
assessment for the effective implementation of the agreed
OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards.83
However, as not all countries have committed to the
BEPS four Minimum Standards (124 of 193 countries/
jurisdictions in the world as at 14 December 2018), this
criterion may also raise questions regarding the legitimacy
of these standards in respect of these countries (mostly
developing countries).84 The analysis of the use of this
standard of fair tax competition will be addressed in the
following section.
4.3.2 The Use of the Standard of Fair Tax
Competition in Bilateral and Multilateral
Agreements
The use of the standard of good governance, including fair
tax competition, raises several problems vis-à-vis third
(non-EU) countries.85
The first problem is the use of the Code of Conduct for
business taxation to assess the tax measures that could be
regarded as harmful tax competition within the scope of
the Code. This Code of Conduct, adopted in December
1997, is soft law, and in principle only works as a
recommendation.86 However, with the developments on
good tax governance and also the EU listing, third (non-
EU) countries are compelled to follow this Code and to
abolish measures that can constitute harmful tax
competition.87 The result is that if the standard is intro-
duced in binding (trade and economic partnership) agree-
ments concluded by the EU with third (non-EU)
countries, this makes fair tax competition a binding stan-
dard for the latter countries, even though it is based in a
Code of Conduct (soft law) not binding for EU countries.
If the standard is included in agreements signed and
ratified, this standard will be binding for third countries
but also for EU countries, and therefore, the question will
be: how will this standard be enforced for third and EU
countries?
The second problem is that the 2016 EU
Communication88 included in the standard of good gov-
ernance in tax matters, state aid provisions. The
Communication states that:
State aid provisions in bilateral agreements, which can
increase transparency on subsidies, prohibit the most
harmful types of subsidies and provide for consultations
on harmful subsidies, would create fairer competition
between Member States and third countries in the area
of business taxation. The Commission will therefore
work to include state aid provisions in negotiating
proposals for agreements with third countries, with a
view to ensuring fair tax competition with its interna-
tional partners.89
As rightly argued by Dourado, there are problems arising
from the introduction of state aid provisions in the standard
of good governance in tax matters and in the agreements/
treaties concluded with third countries. For Dourado:
[from] an EU perspective, state aid provisions in bilat-
eral treaties may increase transparency on subsidies and
create fairer tax competition between Member States
and third countries in the area of business taxation.
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However, they will also increase uncertainty, overload
the Commission with notifications and be detrimental
to the investment in the EU. From the perspective of
the rest of the world, the introduction of state-aid
provisions in bilateral treaties with third countries can
be seen as interference in their tax policies that are
aimed at attracting genuine investment. By prohibiting
selected tax competition, the European Union is requir-
ing third countries to adopt the EU parameters on tax
good governance, which may result in indirect protec-
tionism for EU companies.90
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The standard of good governance in tax matters has been
discussed since 2008, when ECOFIN introduced the stan-
dard with a view to tackle tax fraud and tax evasion. At
that time, the standard included transparency, exchange of
information, and fair tax competition. Later, several inter-
national and EU developments have changed the content
of this standard. The international developments are, for
instance, the adoption of the Global standard on auto-
matic exchange of information in 2013, the BEPS Project
in 2013, the BEPS Inclusive Framework, and the BEPS
four Minimum Standards in 2016. The EU developments
are, for instance, the five amendments to the
Administrative Cooperation Directive, the Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directives (ATAD I and II), and the list of
non-cooperative jurisdictions. As of April 2018, the stan-
dard of good governance in tax matters includes transpar-
ency, exchange of information, fair taxation and the BEPS
four Minimum Standards.
This standard has been introduced as a precondition for
third (non-EU) countries that receive EU development
aid, conclude strategic partnership agreements, free trade
and economic partnership agreements, and, more recently,
as a standard that determines whether the third (non-EU)
country should be included in a single EU common list of
non-cooperative jurisdictions.
This article has addressed two questions, namely (1)
whether the standard of good governance in tax matters is
an import and/or export of EU norms and (2) what is the
legal status of these standards vis-à-vis third (non-EU)
countries?
In respect of the first question, one of the findings of
this article is that, in some elements of this standard
(exchange of information, BEPS and transparency), the
EU is introducing international tax standards, and is
therefore an import of norms; and in another element
(fair tax competition), the EU has developed its own
standard and is therefore an export of norms. In respect
of the second question, the aim of the EU when importing
international tax standards is to play a predominant role
in the current discussion by the OECD/G20 of exchange
of information and BEPS. By doing so, the EU is ensuring
that international tax developments are also addressed in
the relationship by the EU with third (non-EU) countries.
However, in respect of fair tax competition, the EU is
going further than the OECD by introducing its own
standard – one that includes the Code of Conduct of
Business Taxation and the introduction of its own list of
non-cooperative jurisdictions.
Some of the problems identified in this article are: (1)
the vagueness of the fair tax competition concept; (2) the
condition to implement BEPS four Minimum Standards
as a condition for aid, and/or trade for countries who have
decided not to do so (e.g. Philippines) (3) the use of state
aid provisions in the standard of fair tax competition, and;
(4) the different use of the standard in the agreements
(either concluded or ongoing negotiations) with third
(non-EU) countries. These differences have an effect in
the enforcement of this standard, as well as in its imple-
mentation by third (non-EU) countries.
Therefore, the following paragraphs will provide some
questions for further research regarding the implementa-
tion of the standards of good governance in tax matters.
The changes of the standard of good governance in
tax matters raise several questions regarding the legiti-
macy of this standard in respect of third (non-EU)
countries and the practical application of this standard
by countries, and EU officials. Since this standard has
been used in agreements which are binding for the
countries who have signed such agreements (e.g. stra-
tegic partnership agreement EU and Canada), countries
are questioning the legitimacy of the standard of fair
tax competition, as it is mainly based in the EU on the
Code of Conduct and the work of the Code of Conduct
Group (both soft law instruments). The question is,
then, how will the standard of fair tax competition
become hard law in the EU and, if it does not, whether
it is legitimate for the EU to ask third (non-EU)
countries to commit to EU soft law instruments in
binding agreements (hard law).
Another question addresses the introduction of the
BEPS four Minimum Standards in the standard of good
governance in tax matters. Even though 124 countries/
jurisdictions (December 2018) are participating in the
BEPS Inclusive Framework, not all countries currently
negotiating agreements with the EU are participating in
this Framework (e.g. Philippines). Therefore, the question
that is being raised is whether, by signing the EU (trade,
economic, strategic partnership) agreement, the third
(non-EU) countries who are not participating in the
BEPS Inclusive Framework will still be obliged to meet
the BEPS Minimum Standards.
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Finally, two questions that will need to be further
researched are: (1) how will the 2018 text of the standard
of good governance in tax matters influence the current
negotiations on trade, economic, and strategic partner-
ship agreements and (2) will there be a renegotiation to
include BEPS for the concluded agreements. As there are
current negotiations with ASEAN countries, Latin
American countries or ACP countries, it will be vital
to research how the bargaining power of these countries
will influence the introduction of the standard of good
governance in tax matters. Therefore, further research
should be carried out on the use of this standard in
current and future agreements concluded by the EU
and its Members.
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